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Knowledge, Explainer

The ecosystem of a blockade

· Helfen statt Blockieren editorial team

“What actually happens when something is blocked? Then it is a whole ecosystem that goes down.” This is how Aciel Martinez Poll describes the idea behind this section. The explainer uses documented examples to show how a sanction travels from the rule to everyday life, and where causes within the country add to it.

How a block travels

Six stations, three typical stopping points. Tap or use the Tab key to see the example.

1RuleLaw, listor regulation2Banksscreen names,countries, riskAccount closedwhole groupsnot the case:de-risking3Transportinsurersand shipping lines4Suppliersparts, devices,softwareDelivery stoppedmanufacturerwithdraws5Serviceshospital,power, water6Familiesincome,remittancesEmigrationCuba 2025:net migrationabout minus 245,0001RuleLaw, listor regulation2Banksscreen names,countries, riskAccount closedwhole groupsnot the case:de-risking3Transportinsurersand shipping lines4Suppliersparts, devices,softwareDelivery stoppedmanufacturerwithdraws5Serviceshospital,power, water6Familiesincome,remittancesEmigrationCuba 2025:net migrationabout minus 245,000

Sketch: Helfen statt Blockieren. Sources in the sections below.

First station: the rule

It starts with a rule: a law, a list of blocked persons and companies, a regulation. Some address only a country’s own citizens and firms. Others also threaten companies in third countries. Executive Order 14380 of 29 January 2026, for instance, allows additional duties on goods from countries that supply Cuba with oil1.

Second station: the bank

Banks screen every payment against lists. Because violations are expensive, they often refuse more than they must. In 2014 BNP Paribas paid about 8.9 billion US dollars2. In 2022 the European Banking Authority called unwarranted de-risking harmful to the EU’s objectives3. In Cuba about 200 foreign banks have reportedly ended relations since 2021, according to information given to the UN Special Rapporteur4.

Third station: insurers and shipping lines

No ship sails without insurance. Since December 2022 the EU has tied maritime transport and insurance of Russian oil to a price cap5. For Cuba a US rule applies under which a ship may not load in a US port for 180 days after a trade call6. For shipping lines that also serve the US, Cuba thus becomes a costly detour.

Fourth station: the suppliers

Manufacturers in Europe who are not themselves subject to US sanctions need a US licence for Cuba as soon as more than 10 percent of the value is of US origin7. In Iran a European manufacturer stopped selling special dressings for children with epidermolysis bullosa8. In 2019 Cubana cancelled nine routes after lessors terminated contracts9.

Fifth station: hospital, power and water

What is not delivered, paid or insured is missing in the hospital and the power plant. According to information given to the UN Special Rapporteur, 69 percent of medicines are inaccessible in Cuba, blackouts last up to 18 hours, and some regions get water only every few days up to every 30 days4. In August 2026 the grid collapsed nationwide again10.

Sixth station: the family

At the end is the household. Western Union stopped transfers to Cuba again on 5 February 2025 (closed in 2020, later resumed)11. According to the statistics office the population fell to 9.4 million at the end of 2025, with net migration of about minus 245,00012.

What is not part of the chain but adds to it

Not every shortage is a consequence of sanctions. In Cuba critics point to decades of underinvestment in the energy sector10. Freedom House describes state censorship of the internet13. Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch document political detention1415. The UN Special Rapporteur, too, states that primary responsibility for human rights lies with Cuba4. Both belong to the picture: the effect from outside and the responsibility within the country.

Why states impose sanctions anyway

Sanctions are meant to change behaviour without waging war: against nuclear and missile programmes, wars of aggression, terrorism or repression. The US justifies its Cuba policy with the policies of the Cuban government1. To limit side effects, the UN, the EU and the US have created humanitarian exemptions since 2022161718. Whether these exemptions reach down the chain is decided at each of the six stations.

$8.9 bnpenalty on BNP Paribas in 2014 over business with Sudan, Iran and CubaSource 2
about 200foreign banks reportedly ended relations with Cuba since 2021, according to information given to the UNSource 4
13.40%is the average cost of sending 200 US dollars through banks worldwide (Q4 2024)Source 19
99 dayswas the average time for a UN exemption for aid to North Korea in 2018Source 20

Figures marked “according to information given to” are not the cited body’s own measurements but information presented to it.

This page is information, not legal advice. It reports what authorities, courts, governments and organisations decide and say; the views of the side imposing measures and of the side affected stand side by side. “Helfen statt Blockieren” is non-partisan. Please report errors to info@aciel-martinez-poll.com.

Sources

  1. White House, Federal Register 91 FR 5085, “Executive Order 14380: Addressing Threats to the United States by the Government of Cuba (unterzeichnet 29.1.2026)”, 3 Feb 2026. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2026-02-03/html/2026-02250.htm
  2. Banque de France, ACPR, “Following the agreement signed between the US authorities and BNP Paribas”, 30 Jun 2014. https://acpr.banque-france.fr/en/press-release/following-agreement-signed-between-us-authorities-and-bnp-paribas
  3. European Banking Authority (EBA), EBA/Op/2022/01, “EBA alerts on the detrimental impact of unwarranted de-risking and ineffective management of money laundering and terrorist financing risks”, 5 Jan 2022. https://www.eba.europa.eu/publications-and-media/press-releases/eba-alerts-detrimental-impact-unwarranted-de-risking-and
  4. OHCHR, Special Rapporteur Alena Douhan, Preliminary findings of the visit to Cuba, end of mission statement, 11 to 21 November 2025, 21 Nov 2025. Many figures there are marked “reportedly”, i.e. based on information presented to her. https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2133521/20251121-eom-stm-cuba-sr-negative-impact-unilateral-en.pdf
  5. Council of the EU, Regulation (EU) 2022/2367 of 3.12.2022 (price cap on Russian crude by sea), OJ L 311 I of 3.12.2022, S. 1, 3 Dec 2022. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/2367/oj
  6. 31 CFR § 515.207, text at Cornell LII, “Entry of vessels engaged in trade with Cuba”, 3 Nov 2026. https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/31/515.207
  7. Kelley Drye, “BIS tightens Cuba restrictions, lowers de minimis threshold to 10 percent (Federal Register Doc. 2019-22876)”, 21 Oct 2019. https://www.kelleydrye.com/viewpoints/blogs/trade-and-manufacturing-monitor/bis-tightens-cuba-restrictions-lowers-de-minimis-threshold-to-10-percent
  8. Human Rights Watch, ““Maximum Pressure”: US Economic Sanctions Harm Iranians’ Right to Health”, 29 Oct 2019. https://www.hrw.org/report/2019/10/29/maximum-pressure/us-economic-sanctions-harm-iranians-right-health
  9. OnCuba News, “Cubana de Aviación cancels flights due to intensification of blockade”, 26 Oct 2019. https://oncubanews.com/en/cuba-usa/cubana-de-aviacion-cancels-flights-due-to-intensification-of-blockade/
  10. Al Jazeera, “Grid failure plunges Cuba into nationwide blackout”, 3 Aug 2026. https://aljazeera.com/news/2026/8/3/grid-failure-plunges-cuba-into-nationwide-blackout
  11. Havana Times (after 14ymedio), “Western Union Suspends Money Transfers to Cuba”, 8 Feb 2025. https://havanatimes.org/news/western-union-suspends-money-transfers-to-cuba
  12. Arab News (AFP), after figures of the statistics office ONEI of 21.7.2026, “Cuba’s population slide continued in 2025 to 9.4 mn”, 22 Jul 2026. https://www.arabnews.pk/node/2651891/world
  13. Freedom House, “Cuba: Freedom on the Net 2026”, 3 Nov 2026. https://freedomhouse.org/country/cuba/freedom-net/2026
  14. Amnesty International, “Cuba: One year after selective releases, we demand the immediate release of people detained for political reasons”, 19 Jan 2026. https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2026/01/cuba-a-un-ano-de-excarcelaciones-selectivas-exigimos-libertad-inmediata-para-las-personas-presas-por-motivos-politicos/
  15. Human Rights Watch, “World Report 2026: Cuba”, 4 Feb 2026. https://www.ecoi.net/en/document/2136203.html
  16. UN Security Council, press release SC/15134 (9214. meeting), Report on the adoption of Resolution 2664 (2022), 9 Dec 2022. https://press.un.org/en/node/311942
  17. Council of the EU, Regulation (EU) 2023/331 of 14.2.2023 amending certain regulations concerning restrictive measures in order to insert provisions on a humanitarian exemption, OJ L 47 of 15.2.2023, S. 1, 14 Feb 2023. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2023/331/oj
  18. US Treasury, press release JY1175, “Treasury Implements Historic Humanitarian Sanctions Exceptions”, 20 Dec 2022. https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1175
  19. World Bank, Remittance Prices Worldwide, Main report and annex, Q4 2024, December 2024. https://remittanceprices.worldbank.org/sites/default/files/rpw_main_report_and_annex_q424_13.pdf
  20. 38 North, “The Human Costs of UN Sanctions and Funding Shortfalls for Humanitarian Aid in North Korea”, 22 Aug 2019. https://www.38north.org/2019/08/parkkimjong082219/

All online sources accessed on 3 November 2026.

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