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Online magazine by Helfen statt Blockieren · As of 3 November 2026
What embargoes and sanctions are, what caution costs and how aid still gets through.
Sanctions are a tool of policy. Their effects reach far beyond the country they target: into banks, supply chains and families who send money home. This magazine explains the terms, the law and the figures, each with a source and a date. It sets out the facts and leaves the judgement to its readers.
Who bears the cost of a measure meant to hit someone else?
In this issue
About this magazine
“Helfen statt Blockieren” (Help instead of Blockade) is non-partisan. No party, no party-affiliated foundation and no government acts as sponsor or supporter. The magazine reports what authorities, courts, governments and organisations decide and say; the views of the side imposing measures and of the side affected stand side by side.
It is not legal or sanctions advice. Anyone who wants to act should check the individual case with the competent authority or a specialist law firm. All information is as of 3 November 2026; sanctions change often. Please report errors to info@aciel-martinez-poll.com.
01
Chapter 1 · Key terms
In everyday speech many things are called a blockade. In law, four things can be distinguished, and they work very differently.
This chapter as a page of its ownIn the magazine from page 3
An embargo prohibits trade with a country, entirely or for certain goods. An arms embargo covers only military goods. A comprehensive embargo such as the US embargo on Cuba covers almost all transactions by persons and companies subject to US law.
Source: Cuban Assets Control Regulations, 31 CFR Part 515
Sanctions, called “restrictive measures” in the EU, are usually more targeted: asset freezes and travel bans on listed individuals and companies, bans on certain sectors, services or financial transactions. Anyone listed is named in an annex.
Source: Art. 29 TEU, Art. 215 TFEU
Some sanctions laws do not apply only to a country’s own citizens and companies. They also threaten companies in other states with penalties if they do business with a listed country. The US order on Cuba of 1 May 2026, for example, allows sanctions on foreign banks up to the loss of their correspondent accounts in the United States.
Source: Helms-Burton Act 1996; King & Spalding, 6 May 2026, on the order of 1 May 2026
Out of caution, banks and companies often do more than the law requires: they refuse permitted payments or terminate entire groups of customers. On 5 January 2022 the European Banking Authority wrote that unwarranted de-risking can exclude legitimate customers from the financial system and can be a sign of ineffective risk management.
Source: EBA, press release of 5 Jan 2022 (EBA/Op/2022/01)
Under Article 41 of the UN Charter the Security Council can decide on measures not involving armed force, such as interrupting economic relations. Its decisions bind all member states (Article 25).
Source: Charter of the United Nations, Arts. 25 and 41
The Council of the EU adopts sanctions unanimously as a decision under the Common Foreign and Security Policy and implements the economic parts through regulations. They apply in the EU and to persons and companies from the EU, also abroad. The EU implements UN decisions and has its own regimes.
Source: Arts. 29 and 31 TEU, Art. 215 TFEU
Besides the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Switzerland, Norway, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, South Korea and Ukraine, among others, maintain their own regimes or lists; Russia, China and Iran respond with countermeasures (overview in chapter 2). In the US they are administered by OFAC in the Treasury Department. Anyone who pays in US dollars or uses US banks comes into contact with US sanctions, even outside the United States; the UN Special Rapporteur criticises this reliance on the dollar.
Source: OHCHR, 21 Nov 2025; King & Spalding, 6 May 2026
The United Nations uses the term unilateral coercive measures for sanctions imposed by individual states or groups of states without a Security Council decision. The Human Rights Council has appointed a Special Rapporteur on them, currently Alena Douhan. Her report of 4 September 2023 to the General Assembly deals with secondary sanctions and over-compliance. Whether such measures are lawful under international law is disputed among states.
Source: United Nations, A/78/196 of 4 Sep 2023
02
Chapter 2 · World map
Nine countries and fourteen senders: the UN Security Council, the EU, ten states and two regional groupings. The map is schematic: the tiles show the approximate location, no borders and no sizes. Each tile shows who maintains measures against the country according to the official overviews.
This chapter as a page of its ownIn the magazine from page 5
US embargo since the early 1960s, tightened in 2026. Plus obstacles within the country.
Source: Baker McKenzie, 4 Feb 2026 (EO 14380); King & Spalding, 6 May 2026; TSRA 2000, Public Law 106-387; UN Special Rapporteur, 21 Nov 2025
US programme remains in place, with broad oil and gas licences since 2026.
Source: Cleary Gottlieb and Akin Gump, Jan 2026 (GL 46); OFAC, Federal Register Doc. 2026-20831, 13 Oct 2026 (GL 60); Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/2074; Council of the EU, 27 Nov 2023
EU sanctions, extended in parallel with the Russia packages.
Source: Mayer Brown, Apr and Jul 2026; German Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs, page “Embargos”, accessed 3 Nov 2026
21 EU sanctions packages and the listing package of 12 October 2026; the 22nd package has been announced.
Source: McCann FitzGerald, 30 Oct 2026 (Council Decision (CFSP) 2026/2279); Agence Europe, 14 Apr 2022
Economic sanctions largely lifted in 2025; targeted measures remain.
Source: EU Sanctions Helpdesk, 28 May 2025; The National, 17 Dec 2025
UN sanctions back in force since September 2025; their status is disputed in the Security Council.
Source: Mayer Brown, 3 Oct 2025; UN Security Council, SC/16491 (2026)
UN sanctions on the Taliban, with a humanitarian exemption.
Source: UN Security Council, Resolutions 1988 (2011), 2615 (2021), 2664 (2022); Pajhwok Afghan News, 13 Feb 2026
EU measures extended until 30 April 2027.
Source: Council of the EU, 27 Apr 2026, as reproduced by Progressive Voice Myanmar, 27 Apr 2026; Council of the EU, 27 Nov 2023
UN sanctions since 2006; the UN panel of experts ended in 2024, and eleven states have monitored since.
Source: JURIST, 28 Mar 2024; MSMT, joint statement of 18 Sep 2026 (Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs); Government of Ireland, 31 Mar 2023
The EU has further regimes of its own, including on Nicaragua, Burundi, Guinea, Zimbabwe, Bosnia and Herzegovina and against cyber-attacks; a humanitarian exemption has applied to them since 27 November 2023. There are also United Nations regimes, including on Haiti, Yemen, Libya, Somalia, Sudan and South Sudan.
Source: Council of the EU, 27 Nov 2023 (via ReliefWeb); Government of Ireland, 31 Mar 2023
Chapter 2 · Overview
For the nine countries on the map, the table shows which actors maintain measures there. Only what the actor’s official overview or the cited source names is entered; the source is given in each row. As of 3 November 2026.
| Actor | Cuba | Venez. | Belarus | Russia | Syria | Iran | Afgh. | Myanmar | N. Korea | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| UNUN Security Council | ●a | ● | ● | UN Security Council, overview of sanctions committees (15 active regimes), accessed 3 Nov 2026 | ||||||
| USUnited States | ● | ● | ● | ● | ●b | ● | ● | ● | ● | OFAC, Sanctions Programs and Country Information, accessed 3 Nov 2026 (Syria: PAARSS programme) |
| EUEuropean Union | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | Profiles in this chapter; Afghanistan: Regulation (EU) No 753/2011 | |
| UKUnited Kingdom | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | GOV.UK, UK sanctions regimes, lists updated up to 30 Oct 2026 | |
| CACanada | ● | ● | ● | ●c | ● | ● | ● | Global Affairs Canada, Current sanctions imposed by Canada; Syria: page of 31 Jul 2026 (SOR/2026-23) | ||
| CHSwitzerland | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | SECO, sanctions ordinances (28 entries), accessed 3 Nov 2026 | |
| NONorway | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | DEKSA (Norwegian Agency for Export Control and Sanctions), Applicable Sanctions, accessed 3 Nov 2026 | |
| JPJapan | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | Ministry of Finance of Japan, overview of economic sanctions, as of 2 Oct 2026 | |||
| AUAustralia | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | DFAT, Sanctions snapshot (UN and autonomous regimes), accessed 3 Nov 2026 | |||
| NZNew Zealand | ●g | ● | MFAT, Russia Sanctions (Russia Sanctions Act 2022); SunLive, 17 May 2022 (Belarus) | |||||||
| KRSouth Korea | ●f | ●f | ● | Korea JoongAng Daily, 2 Dec 2022 (own North Korea listings); Korea Times, 5 Sep 2024 (export bans) | ||||||
| UAUkraine | ● | ● | ● | President of Ukraine, 1 Jul 2025 (adoption of EU listings on Russia, Belarus, Iran) | ||||||
| TIARRio Treaty (TIAR) | ●e | Congressional Research Service, IN11116, 11 Dec 2019 | ||||||||
| ALArab League | ●d | SIPRI, arms embargoes database, accessed 3 Nov 2026 |
How to read the table: an empty cell means that the actor’s overview consulted names no regime of its own for that country. It does not mean that nothing applies there: decisions of the UN Security Council bind all member states (Art. 25 UN Charter), and many states implement them in their own law. Measures by Russia, China and Iran are aimed mainly at states that are not on the map; they are described below the table. The table does not judge whether a measure is justified.
The number in brackets is the resolution after which the committee is named. On 6 November 2025 the Council removed Syria’s transitional president Ahmed al-Sharaa and interior minister Anas Khattab from the ISIL and Al-Qaida list (Resolution 2799, 14 votes in favour, China abstaining).
Source: UN Security Council, overview of sanctions committees, accessed 3 Nov 2026; ASIL, on Resolution 2799 of 6 Nov 2025
Since August 2014 Russia has banned imports of certain foods from the United States, the EU, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Norway, Ukraine, Albania, Montenegro, Iceland and Liechtenstein. In September 2026 the government extended the ban to 31 December 2028.
Since early 2022 the government has kept a list of “unfriendly” states and territories; certain transactions with partners from these states require approval.
Source: HortiDaily, 22 Sep 2026; Al Jazeera, 8 Mar 2022
On 24 April 2023 the Iranian foreign ministry imposed sanctions on 17 persons and 4 entities from the EU and the United Kingdom, among them eight European lawmakers and the German-Israeli Society. Tehran described this as a response to European sanctions against Iranian officials.
Source: Asharq Al-Awsat, 25 Apr 2023
China keeps an Unreliable Entity List (81 entries in total up to 7 Aug 2026, including suspended ones) and, under the 2021 Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law, a countermeasure list (78 persons, 89 entities).
Examples: ban on exports of dual-use items to military users in Japan (6 Jan 2026); first blocking order against US listings of Chinese refineries (2 May 2026); 14 EU companies placed on the export control list in response to the EU’s 21st Russia package (24 Jul 2026). The rare-earth export controls of 9 Oct 2025 are suspended until 10 Nov 2026; the controls of 4 Apr 2025 on seven rare earths remain in force.
Source: AnJie Broad via China Law Vision, 14 Aug 2026; GTAI, January 2026; Pillsbury, 13 Nov 2025
After unconstitutional changes of government the Peace and Security Council suspends membership. Guinea-Bissau was suspended on 28 Nov 2025, Madagascar after the coup in October 2025. Sudan has been suspended since October 2021; the Council confirmed this in February 2026. Amani Africa lists Burkina Faso, Guinea, Mali and Niger as further countries in transition.
Source: Amani Africa, 16 Dec 2025; JURIST, February 2026
After the coup in Niger in July 2023, ECOWAS suspended commercial and financial transactions, froze Niger’s assets at the central banks and imposed travel bans. On 24 February 2024 it lifted these sanctions, as well as financial and economic sanctions on Guinea and restrictions on Mali.
Source: JURIST, 24 Feb 2024
In November 2011 the League imposed economic and financial sanctions on the Syrian government and suspended Syria’s membership; an arms embargo applied from 3 Dec 2011. Syria was readmitted on 7 May 2023. SIPRI found no formal lifting of the embargo.
Source: SIPRI, arms embargoes database; Al-Monitor, 7 May 2023
The Organization of American States excluded the government of Cuba from participation in 1962; on 3 June 2009 the General Assembly declared that decision without effect (AG/RES. 2438). Under the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (TIAR), 16 of 19 states parties decided on 23 Sep 2019 on asset freezes against officials of the Maduro government; a list of 29 persons followed on 3 Dec 2019.
Source: OAS, AG/RES. 2438 (XXXIX-O/09); Congressional Research Service, IN11116, 11 Dec 2019
03
Chapter 3 · What caution costs
Sanctions work not only through prohibitions but also through the caution of those who comply with them. These figures are documented; they measure different things and cannot be added up.
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was the global cost to financial institutions of complying with financial crime rules, according to a study of 1,181 professionals.
Source: LexisNexis Risk Solutions, press release of 26 Sep 2023
say the web of regulations and sanctions constrains their business; in Europe, the Middle East and Africa the figure is 80 percent.
Source: LexisNexis Risk Solutions, 26 Sep 2023, via Finextra
was paid by BNP Paribas in 2014 for violating US sanctions on Sudan, Cuba and Iran. The case concerned payments in US dollars through the US financial system.
Source: Al Jazeera, 30 Jun 2014
is the global average cost of a remittance. The measure is the cost of sending 200 US dollars.
Source: World Bank, Remittance Prices Worldwide, home page of 18 Aug 2025, accessed 3 Nov 2026
The Sustainable Development Goals call for reducing remittance costs to less than 3 percent, with no corridor above 5 percent.
Source: World Bank, indicator SI.RMT.COST.OB.ZS, target 10.c
confirmed that it was suspending transfers between the US and Cuba indefinitely, after the US had added the processor Orbit S.A. to its list of restricted Cuban entities.
Source: Bloomberg Línea, 10 Feb 2025
United Nations, 21 November 2025
“De-risking policies and over-compliance have been substantially exacerbating the humanitarian situation.”
Alena Douhan, UN Special Rapporteur on unilateral coercive measures, visited Cuba in November 2025. In her preliminary statement she describes banks refusing to carry out any transaction and transport companies refusing to guarantee deliveries. Remittances, she writes, are officially exempt but have become hard to receive since Western Union withdrew in February 2025. Payments and procurement have become more expensive, slower and less transparent.
She calls on the US to lift the measures and on banks and companies to avoid over-compliance. At the same time she acknowledges Cuba’s primary responsibility for protecting human rights and calls on the government to cooperate with UN mechanisms and to host further Special Rapporteurs. The final report was announced for the Human Rights Council in September 2026.
Source: OHCHR, end-of-mission statement, Havana, 21 Nov 2025
De-risking can be a legitimate risk management tool, but when unwarranted it excludes people (5 January 2022). Guidelines of 31 Mar 2023, applicable since 3 November 2023: banks must consider several options before rejecting a customer and follow set steps before ending a relationship. Refusing entire categories of customers without looking at individual risk can be unwarranted. For the most vulnerable, such as refugees and homeless people, it can be a matter of survival.
Source: EBA, press releases of 5 Jan 2022 and 31 Mar 2023 (EBA/GL/2023/04); Finanssivalvonta, 2 Nov 2023
The Special Rapporteur’s report “Secondary sanctions, overcompliance and human rights” was submitted to the UN General Assembly on 4 September 2023. It examines how fear of penalties also prevents permitted business, aid and payments.
Source: United Nations, A/78/196 of 4 Sep 2023
04
Chapter 4 · Law
Three sources of law determine what applies in Europe when foreign sanctions and humanitarian aid meet.
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The Regulation of 22 November 1996 prohibits companies and persons in the EU from complying with the foreign sanctions laws listed in its annex. Judgments based on them are not recognised in the EU; anyone harmed can claim damages. Those affected must inform the Commission within 30 days. Anyone who must deviate applies for an authorisation.
From the start its annex listed US laws on Cuba, Iran and Libya; since 2018 the renewed US sanctions on Iran have also been listed. On 22 November 2026 the Regulation turns 30.
Source: Reg. (EC) No 2271/96, OJ L 309, 29 Nov 1996; Delegated Reg. (EU) 2018/1100 of 6 Jun 2018
On 21 December 2021 the Court ruled in Bank Melli Iran v Telekom Deutschland: the prohibition on compliance applies even where no US authority has issued an order.
Where the evidence suggests at first sight that a termination served to comply with foreign sanctions, the company must show otherwise in court; the prohibition does not, however, require reasons for a termination in every case. At the same time the courts examine whether the prohibition places a disproportionate burden on the company.
Source: CJEU (Grand Chamber), judgment of 21 Dec 2021, C-124/20, ECLI:EU:C:2021:1035
The Resolution provides that funds, goods and services necessary for the timely delivery of humanitarian assistance or for other activities that support basic human needs do not violate UN asset freezes. It applies to UN programmes and agencies, to humanitarian organisations with observer status at the General Assembly and to certain non-governmental organisations.
It applies to all UN sanctions regimes; for the ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida regime initially for two years. It was put forward by Ireland and the United States. 14 members voted in favour; India abstained.
Source: UN Security Council, Resolution 2664 (2022), 9214th meeting, 9 Dec 2022; Security Council Report, Dec 2022
Exemption for humanitarian partner organisations in the Ukraine regime, for exclusively humanitarian purposes in Ukraine.
Source: Agence Europe, 14 Apr 2022
Resolution 2664 transposed in six UN-only regimes: Central African Republic, Haiti, Iraq, Lebanon, Somalia, Yemen.
Source: Government of Ireland, 31 Mar 2023
Eight mixed regimes follow, including North Korea, Iran and Libya. 14 EU regimes now carry the exemption; no licence is needed.
Source: Government of Ireland, 31 Mar 2023
Ten autonomous EU regimes receive the exemption, including Myanmar, Nicaragua and Venezuela. The Council reviews them regularly.
Source: Council of the EU, 27 Nov 2023 (via ReliefWeb)
The EU counter-terrorism framework also receives an exemption, initially for twelve months.
Source: Agence Europe, 19 Feb 2024
OFAC implemented Resolution 2664 on 20 December 2022 with new and amended general licences that go beyond the UN regimes across its sanctions programmes, including for activities of non-governmental organisations.
Source: Buchanan Ingersoll & Rooney, on the OFAC action of 20 Dec 2022
Exemption authorisations are issued by the Federal Office for Economic Affairs and Export Control (BAFA) for goods, services and technical assistance, and by the Deutsche Bundesbank through its Financial Sanctions Service Centre for funds and financial resources.
Source: German Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs, page “Embargos”, accessed 3 Nov 2026
In Germany every consumer lawfully resident in the EU is entitled to a basic payment account, including asylum seekers and people without a fixed address.
Source: Section 31 German Payment Accounts Act (ZKG)
05
Chapter 5 · Focus
Cuba shows both: a US embargo that also reaches companies in third countries, and hardship that also has causes at home. This chapter sets out both sides with sources.
This chapter as a page of its ownIn the magazine from page 16
The US imposes the embargo; the Cuban Assets Control Regulations have applied since 1963.
Source: 31 CFR Part 515
The Helms-Burton Act is expressly aimed at companies from third countries too. It is one reason for the EU Blocking Statute.
Source: Reg. (EC) No 2271/96, annex
The TSRA (Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act) allows sales of food and medicines, with a licence and against payment in advance.
Source: Public Law 106-387, Title IX
Western Union suspends transfers to Cuba after the US listed the processor Orbit S.A.
Source: Bloomberg Línea, 10 Feb 2025
Presidential order (Executive Order 14380): national emergency with respect to Cuba, additional tariffs on countries supplying oil.
Source: Baker McKenzie, 4 Feb 2026
New order: secondary sanctions on foreign companies and banks in energy, defence, mining, finance and security.
Source: King & Spalding, 6 May 2026
For the 34th time the General Assembly called for an end to the US embargo against Cuba: 130 states voted in favour, 17 against and 25 abstained. In 2025 the figures were 165 in favour, 7 against and 12 abstentions. Those voting against included the US, Israel, Argentina, Paraguay, Colombia, Ecuador and Costa Rica. The resolution is a recommendation and does not bind the US.
Source: United Nations, General Assembly, 28 Oct 2026; NTN24, 28 Oct 2026
Decisions within the country also contribute to the hardship. On 1 January 2021 the government introduced the currency reform “Tarea Ordenamiento” and set a single official rate of 24 pesos per US dollar; severe inflation followed. State rules for the economy and trade and tight limits on private initiative add to this.
The power grid collapsed nationwide several times in 2026; on 3 August, by Bloomberg Línea’s count, for the sixth time that year. Primicias cites as causes the fuel shortage, partly due to US oil pressure, and low generating capacity.
Source: Diario Libre, 10 Dec 2020; Bloomberg Línea, 3 Aug 2026; Primicias, 4 Aug 2026
Amnesty International documents cases of people imprisoned in Cuba for political reasons. The organisation describes the releases of 2025 as selective and calls for the immediate release of the people imprisoned for political reasons.
Source: Amnesty International, “Cuba: a un año de excarcelaciones selectivas, exigimos libertad inmediata para las personas presas por motivos políticos”, 19 Jan 2026, amnesty.org
After her visit, Alena Douhan described shortages of medicines, food, fuel and spare parts and attributed them largely to the US measures and over-compliance. She called on the US to lift the measures and at the same time acknowledged Cuba’s primary responsibility for human rights.
Source: OHCHR, 21 Nov 2025
The Observatorio Cubano de Derechos Humanos (OCDH) disagreed: the crisis, it said, is a direct consequence of the failure of the communist system, not of sanctions. In its own survey only 3 percent of respondents blamed the embargo for their problems. It asked that democratic voices from Cuba also be heard.
Source: CiberCuba, 25 Nov 2025, on the OCDH’s 8th report on social rights
On terminology: the Cuban government speaks of the “bloqueo”, the United Nations of the embargo. This magazine uses “US embargo”.
06
Chapter 6 · Routes
Humanitarian aid is permitted under almost all regimes. It often fails not because of the law but because of uncertainty. These routes are lawfully open; they do not replace checking the individual case.
This chapter as a page of its ownIn the magazine from page 18
Aid organisations with partners on the ground know the rules, check recipients and document how funds are used. A donation for a specific purpose is the simplest route; three examples for Cuba follow below.
Resolution 2664, the EU exemptions and the OFAC general licences permit humanitarian activities without individual authorisation. They apply to certain humanitarian actors such as UN organisations and recognised aid organisations, not to every private person; that is another reason why giving through an aid organisation is the simplest route.
Source: Resolution 2664 (2022); Government of Ireland, 31 Mar 2023; Buchanan Ingersoll & Rooney
Before every payment, check whether the recipient or its bank is listed. The EU shows all regimes on its sanctions map (www.sanctionsmap.eu); the lists in the legal acts are binding.
Source: EU Sanctions Map, accessed 3 Nov 2026
Where an exemption requires authorisation, in Germany BAFA is competent for goods and services and the Bundesbank for funds. In-kind donations also need an export and customs check.
Source: German Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs, page “Embargos”
If a bank refuses a permitted payment, ask for the reason. Under the EBA guidelines, banks must assess the individual risk before refusing. Consumers are entitled to a basic account.
Source: EBA/GL/2023/04 of 31 Mar 2023; Section 31 ZKG
Companies in the EU may not comply with the US laws on Cuba and Iran listed in its annex. Anyone disadvantaged by these laws informs the Commission within 30 days.
Source: Reg. (EC) No 2271/96
Note: this chapter describes the legal situation in general terms, as of 3 November 2026. It is not legal or sanctions advice. In the EU no funds or economic resources may be made available to listed persons and companies, not even as a donation; the humanitarian exemptions apply only to the actors and purposes named in them.
Aid organisations with projects in Cuba
These three aid organisations run projects in Cuba. At Helfen statt Blockieren, donations for the people of Cuba go directly to them, not to the organiser. The aid organisations do not thereby take any political position. The EU has no economic sanctions against Cuba.
Project: microcredits in Cuba. “They are granted to women and men with a business idea that enables them to earn their own income.”
Project “Hope for Cuba”: the Loyola Centres in Cuba, from Nuremberg above all the centres in Camagüey and Santiago de Cuba. According to the organisation, earmarked donations go to the project in full.
Project: a solar installation for a children’s hospital in Havana. According to the association, donations go to the solar project in full.
Donation receipts are issued by each aid organisation. Logos of EBM INTERNATIONAL and jesuitenweltweit used with the organisations’ consent. Payment references as given by the organisations.
Online workshops 16 to 19 November, culture week in Berlin 20 to 24 November, programme at www.helfen-statt-blockieren.com
07
Chapter 7 · Glossary
Briefly explained, in the sense used in this magazine.
This chapter as a page of its ownIn the magazine from page 20
Evidence
All sources with dates. Online sources accessed on 2 and 3 November 2026.
Publisher
Founder of Helfen statt Blockieren · actor · musical theatre performer · director · author
Aciel Martinez Poll was born in Nuevitas in 1990 and grew up in Sola in the province of Camagüey. He has lived in Germany since 2001. He is a state-certified actor, musical theatre performer and theatre educator and has worked as a theatre educator and director since 2009.
He belongs to no party. In his work he speaks about blockades from outside as well as obstacles within the country. “Helfen statt Blockieren” is his non-partisan initiative.
Web: www.helfen-statt-blockieren.com · www.aciel-martinez-poll.com
Legal notice
Not legal or sanctions advice. Donations go directly to the aid organisations; Helfen statt Blockieren does not accept money on their behalf.