Blockades of the world economy

Blockades are not only measures against single countries. They run between economic blocs, between the US and China, between the EU and Russia, across the Gulf, and they cause damage far beyond their targets. This chapter sets out the main blockades of the world economy in autumn 2026, with figures and sources, without taking sides with any government.

From countries to economic blocs

Research has counted sanctions since 1914. The first case collection begins with the British blockade of Germany in the First World War; by 2000 it lists 174 cases (Hufbauer et al.). Even then blocs were often at stake: from 1948 to 1994 the US and the CoCom control group restricted deliveries of strategic goods to the Soviet Union and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance; the Arab League boycotted Israel from 1946 and imposed an oil embargo on the US and the Netherlands in 1973 to 1974 (ibid.).

The Global Sanctions Data Base counts 18 sanction cases in force in 1950, 136 in 1990, 271 in 2019 and 615 in 2023; 121 new cases were added in 2023, more than in any previous year (GSDB R4). The US accounts for 46.5% of all active cases in 2023. Its stock has grown by about 37 cases a year since 2018, the EU’s faster since 2019 than before, while the United Nations has held fewer cases since 2015. The group of other senders, including Russia with counter-sanctions and the United Kingdom after Brexit, is growing as steeply as the US. The number says nothing about severity: an entry ban counts like an embargo. The share of financial and travel sanctions rose markedly from 1990 to 2023, the share of pure trade sanctions fell (time series with all figures).

Tariffs in 2025 and 2026

In 2025 the US imposed tariffs on almost all trading partners, based on the emergency law IEEPA. On 20 February 2026 the Supreme Court ruled that this law does not authorise tariffs (judgment, Holland & Knight). The government stopped collection on 24 February 2026; according to customs, about 166 billion US dollars had been collected from more than 330,000 importers, and 81 billion had been refunded by July 2026. As a replacement a temporary Section 122 tariff applied from 24 February 2026; since 24 July 2026 Section 301 tariffs apply to goods from 60 economies: 10 percent for example for the United Kingdom, India, Mexico and Canada (goods under the USMCA agreement exempt), 10 percent net of the most-favoured-nation tariff for the EU and Taiwan, 12.5 percent for example for China, Brazil, Vietnam and Russia (Global Trade Alert). Section 232 tariffs on steel and aluminium were raised to 50 percent on 4 June 2025 (proclamation).

The Yale Budget Lab puts the average US tariff rate at 11.1 percent in July 2026 and the cost at about 0.7 percent higher prices, or about 1,100 US dollars per household and year (Yale). German exports to the US from January to August 2026 were 6.5 percent below 2024, cars 26.8 percent (Eurostat, own analysis). Between the US and China a truce has applied since 10 November 2025: lower tariffs on both sides and suspended Chinese raw material controls; it was extended to 10 January 2027, with the contested issues postponed (China Briefing, Rinnovabili). The EU also uses tariffs: since 30 October 2024 countervailing duties of 7.8 to 35.3 percent apply to electric cars from China (Commission).

Export controls: chips against raw materials

Since October 2022 the US has restricted exports of advanced chips and chipmaking equipment to China and tightened the rules in 2023 and 2024 (Federal Register 2022, 2024). The cost shows up at individual firms: after a new licence requirement of 9 April 2025, NVIDIA booked a 4.5 billion US dollar charge and expected about 8.0 billion US dollars less revenue in the following quarter (NVIDIA).

China responds with controls on raw materials: an export ban on gallium, germanium and antimony to the US (December 2024), a licence requirement for seven rare earths (April 2025), an expansion with effect outside China (October 2025). The expansion was first suspended until 10 November 2026 and extended with the truce to 10 January 2027; the April 2025 controls remain (GvW). In Germany, 11.2 percent of industrial firms reported material shortages in November 2025, 27.6 percent in the car industry; ifo considered China’s controls the likely cause (ifo via dpa-AFX).

Money: SWIFT and the alternatives

Exclusion from payments is the sharpest tool against an economic bloc. In 2012 SWIFT disconnected sanctioned Iranian banks (SWIFT), in 2022 the EU excluded seven Russian banks (Council of the EU); since the 20th package of 23 April 2026 EU firms may not do business with 70 Russian banks (Commission). The other side is building its own routes: China’s CIPS processed payments of 175.49 trillion yuan in 2024, 42.6 percent more than in 2023, but still relies largely on SWIFT for messaging (overview).

Russia: the most comprehensive sanctions regime against a major economy

This is how the authors of the Global Sanctions Data Base describe the measures after the attack on Ukraine (GSDB R4). Their finding is sober: Russia’s trade with the sanctioning states fell after 2022 by about 24 percent on average relative to its trade with other states, much less than under complete embargoes, because trade with China, India and Turkey became easier. By July 2026 the EU had adopted 21 packages; the listing package followed on 12 October 2026, and the 22nd package has been announced (as of November 2026, Blockades worldwide). German exports to Russia fell from 26.8 billion euros (2021) to 6.9 billion euros (2025), while exports to Kyrgyzstan in 2023 rose to 14 times their 2021 level (Eurostat, own analysis). The sanctions and counter-sanctions of 2014 already cost both sides: Russia lost about 53 billion US dollars of exports in 2014 to 2015, the sanctioning countries about 42 billion, mostly in goods that were not banned at all (Crozet and Hinz).

The Gulf: Hormuz in 2026 and the blockade of Qatar

After the US and Israeli attacks on Iran from 28 February 2026, Iran attacked ships; insurance disappeared, and in June 2026 the Strait of Hormuz was effectively closed, according to Brookings. Before the war about 15 million barrels of crude and 5 million barrels of products passed through it each day. Since 13 April 2026 the US has blockaded Iran’s seaborne oil exports. The International Energy Agency calls an output loss of more than 14 million barrels a day the largest supply disruption in the history of the oil market (Brookings). Economists at the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas calculated in March that world growth in the second quarter would be 2.9 percentage points (annualised) lower, and 0.2 to 1.3 points lower by the end of 2026 depending on duration (Dallas Fed). The IMF expects world growth of 3.1 percent in 2026 (IMF).

The Gulf also knows blockades within the region: from 5 June 2017 to 5 January 2021 Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Egypt closed airspace, land border and ports to Qatar (overview).

Mercosur, ASEAN, Africa: barriers and new agreements

The countermovement to the blockades is new agreements. The EU’s trade agreement with Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay was signed on 17 January 2026 and has been applied provisionally since 1 May 2026, while the EU Court of Justice examines it at the request of the European Parliament (White & Case, Euronews). ASEAN and China signed an upgraded version of their free trade agreement on 28 October 2025 (The Star). At the same time the new US tariffs hit Brazil and Vietnam with 12.5 percent (Global Trade Alert).

In Africa, US duty-free access under AGOA lapsed at the end of September 2025 and was only renewed retroactively, then extended in September 2026 to the end of 2028 (CalChamber). Within Africa, the ECOWAS community closed borders, trade and payments with Niger after the 2023 coup; it lifted the measures on 24 February 2024 (ICIR).

Cuba: one of the oldest cases

The US embargo on Cuba has been in place since 1960 and is one of the oldest cases still running in the collection by Hufbauer and co-authors (Hufbauer et al.). It hampers trade, payments and remittances. At the same time the Cuban leadership bears responsibility for the failure of its own economic policy and for repression: Prisoners Defenders counted 1,351 political prisoners at the end of September 2026 (Prisoners Defenders). More in the article on Cuba in 2026.

What the damage costs

For the world economy as a whole there are only ranges. In 2023 the IMF estimated that a split into blocs could cost between 0.2 and 7 percent of world output in the long run, with technological decoupling 8 to 12 percent in some countries (IMF); the WTO Director-General put a split into two blocs at no less than 5 percent (WTO). Global Trade Alert counted 4,351 new harmful trade measures and 1,547 liberalising ones in 2025; since 2020 there have been on average 4.2 new barriers for every opening (Global Trade Alert). The individual sources with ranges are on the page Economic bloc against economic bloc.

What remains open

Release 5 of the Global Sanctions Data Base counts 1,794 cases from 1950 to the end of 2025; its data are available only on request. Annual figures for active cases (such as 615 in 2023) come from the published charts of Release 4 and run to 2023. Redistribution of the data is prohibited. For many blockades between economic blocs there is no documented damage estimate. And cause and effect can rarely be separated: war, energy prices, interest rates and structural change act at the same time. Anyone quoting a single figure for “the cost of blockades” should disclose their assumptions.

Sources

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29. Kilian, Plante, Richter: What the closure of the Strait of Hormuz means for the global economy. Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, 20 March 2026. https://www.dallasfed.org/research/economics/2026/0320
30. IMF: World Economic Outlook, October 2026, 13 October 2026. https://www.imf.org/en/publications/weo/issues/2026/10/13/world-economic-outlook-october-2026
31. Qatar diplomatic crisis 2017 to 2021, overview with references (Wikipedia). https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qatar_diplomatic_crisis
32. White & Case: EU to provisionally apply EU-Mercosur Interim Trade Agreement pending CJEU opinion, 10 March 2026. https://www.whitecase.com/insight-alert/eu-provisionally-apply-eu-mercosur-interim-trade-agreement-pending-cjeu-opinion
33. Euronews: EU says Mercosur deal set for provisional application from 1 May, 23 March 2026. https://euronews.com/my-europe/2026/03/23/eu-says-mercosur-deal-set-for-provisional-application-from-1-may
34. The Star: Asean-China Free Trade Area Upgrade marks major boost, 28 October 2025. https://www.thestar.com.my/news/nation/2025/10/28/asean-china-free-trade-area-upgrade-marks-major-boost-in-economic-cooperation-trade-facilitation
35. California Chamber of Commerce: President Signs Another Short-Term Renewal of Trade Preference for African Nations, 8 September 2026. https://advocacy.calchamber.com/news/2026/09/president-signs-another-short-term-renewal-of-trade-preference-for-african-nations
36. ICIR Nigeria: ECOWAS lifts sanctions on Niger, Mali, Burkina Faso, 24 February 2024. https://www.icirnigeria.org/ecowas-lifts-sanctions-on-niger-mali-burkina-faso/
37. Prisoners Defenders: political prisoners in Cuba, report for September 2026, 15 October 2026. https://www.prisonersdefenders.org/2026/10/15/presos-politicos-cuba-septiembre-2026/
38. Aiyar et al.: Geoeconomic Fragmentation and the Future of Multilateralism, IMF Staff Discussion Note SDN/2023/001, 15 January 2023; figures as reported by Reuters via Malay Mail, 16 January 2023. https://www.malaymail.com/news/money/2023/01/16/imf-says-fragmentation-could-cost-global-economy-up-to-7pc-of-gdp/50425
39. WTO Director-General Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, as reported by Islands Business, 4 May 2023. https://islandsbusiness.com/news-break/trade-fragmentation/