Blockades do not only hit single countries. Tariffs, export controls, investment screening and payment bans now target whole economic blocs, and the damage reaches far beyond the targets. This page counts the measures, shows who blocks whom with what, and gives only damage estimates that are documented.
Trade barriers since 2009
By year of entry into force. Harmful, as defined by Global Trade Alert, means discriminating against foreign suppliers (tariffs, subsidies for domestic firms, export bans, investment conditions). 2026 to 2 November: 4,411 harmful and 1,488 liberalising measures. Recent years are still revised upwards because of reporting lags.
| Year | harmful | liberalising |
|---|---|---|
| 2009 | 3,081 | 451 |
| 2010 | 2,855 | 513 |
| 2011 | 3,002 | 530 |
| 2012 | 3,197 | 586 |
| 2013 | 3,174 | 575 |
| 2014 | 3,179 | 536 |
| 2015 | 3,197 | 606 |
| 2016 | 2,778 | 583 |
| 2017 | 2,823 | 596 |
| 2018 | 3,225 | 619 |
| 2019 | 3,114 | 629 |
| 2020 | 6,048 | 1,212 |
| 2021 | 5,612 | 1,014 |
| 2022 | 5,963 | 1,345 |
| 2023 | 5,302 | 1,170 |
| 2024 | 4,590 | 1,268 |
| 2025 | 4,351 | 1,547 |
Source: Global Trade Alert, as of 2 November 2026, CC BY-NC 4.0; annual figures only, with source; we do not redistribute the raw data.
As defined by the Global Trade Alert topic pages (G7, BRICS); these use a narrower rating level than the overall series above, so the figures are not directly comparable.
| Year | G7 | BRICS |
|---|---|---|
| 2009 | 1,089 | 1,238 |
| 2010 | 1,247 | 911 |
| 2011 | 1,133 | 1,191 |
| 2012 | 1,117 | 1,331 |
| 2013 | 1,024 | 1,299 |
| 2014 | 1,028 | 1,400 |
| 2015 | 1,116 | 1,218 |
| 2016 | 974 | 1,022 |
| 2017 | 955 | 1,139 |
| 2018 | 1,193 | 1,177 |
| 2019 | 1,113 | 1,109 |
| 2020 | 2,664 | 1,489 |
| 2021 | 2,307 | 1,591 |
| 2022 | 2,314 | 1,873 |
| 2023 | 1,989 | 1,740 |
| 2024 | 1,800 | 1,683 |
| 2025 | 1,775 | 1,342 |
Source: Global Trade Alert, as of 2 November 2026, CC BY-NC 4.0; annual figures only, with source; we do not redistribute the raw data.
On average 3,057 harmful measures a year entered into force in 2009 to 2019, 5,311 in 2020 to 2025. The jump in 2020 coincides with the pandemic; export restrictions on medical goods alone rose from 9 (2019) to 207 (2020). The G7 doubled their harmful measures from 1,113 (2019) to 2,664 (2020); the BRICS states stood at 1,342 in 2025. Liberalising measures also increased, from 451 (2009) to 1,547 (2025), but more slowly: a trend of 63 a year against 168 for harmful ones. Most harmful measures since 2008 were implemented by: United States of America 12,624, China 9,598, Brazil 8,362, Germany 4,838, India 3,768, Italy 3,665 (Global Trade Alert). Many of them are subsidies and small tariff steps; the count says nothing about the trade volume affected.
The WTO measures volume: new import restrictions by the G20 from mid-October 2024 to mid-October 2025 covered goods worth 2,599 billion US dollars or 14.3 percent of their imports, more than four times the previous year; all restrictions introduced since 2009 and still in force covered 22.0 percent of G20 imports, against 12.9 percent a year earlier (WTO). Across all WTO members, new restrictions in the same period covered imports of 2,640 billion US dollars or 11.1 percent (WTO). At the same time, according to the WTO, about 72 percent of goods trade still takes place on WTO terms.
2026 to 2 November. Each topic is a separate Global Trade Alert collection with its own scope; do not add rows.
| Topic | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Investment restrictions | 55 | 126 | 123 | 84 | 82 | 95 | 104 | 206 |
| Import and export restrictions, critical minerals | 42 | 57 | 51 | 160 | 108 | 84 | 240 | 115 |
| Export controls, semiconductors | 2 | 3 | 4 | 23 | 47 | 24 | 21 | 3 |
| Economic sanctions over the war against Ukraine | 0 | 0 | 4 | 479 | 245 | 303 | 365 | 353 |
| China’s sanctions and countermeasures against the US | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 6 | 22 | 50 | 5 |
| Trade measures responding to the 2026 Iran war | 0 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 2 | 421 |
Source: Global Trade Alert, as of 2 November 2026, CC BY-NC 4.0; annual figures only, with source; we do not redistribute the raw data.
Who blocks whom, and with what
Arrow from the imposing side to the affected side. Line style and colour show the instrument. Hover, tap or use the tab key for content, date and documented damage. A selection of the main relations, not a complete list.
- Sanctions and financial bans
- Tariffs
- Opening through agreements
- Export and raw material controls
- Closure of sea routes
On narrow screens the same information is in the table below.
| Who | against whom | with what | since | estimated damage (documented only) | Sources |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| US | China | Tariffs: Section 301 tariffs since 2018; since 24 July 2026 an extra 12.5 percent (Section 301, forced labour). The Supreme Court ruled the 2025 tariffs based on the emergency law IEEPA unlawful on 20 February 2026. | 2018 | Truce since 10 November 2025, extended to 10 January 2027. No documented overall damage estimate was found in this research. | [1] [2] [3] [4] |
| US | China | Export and raw material controls: Export controls on advanced chips, manufacturing equipment and memory chips, listing of Chinese firms (Entity List). | October 2022, tightened 2023 and 2024 | Single example: NVIDIA booked a 4.5 billion US dollar charge in the first quarter of fiscal 2026, could not ship 2.5 billion US dollars of H20 chips and expected about 8.0 billion US dollars less revenue in the following quarter. | [5] [6] [7] [8] |
| China | US | Export and raw material controls: Export controls on critical raw materials and rare earths; export ban on gallium, germanium, antimony and superhard materials to the US (announcement 46/2024); licence requirement for seven rare earths (18/2025); expansion with effect outside China (61/2025). | 2023; December 2024; April and October 2025 | October 2025 expansion first suspended until 10 November 2026, extended with the truce to 10 January 2027; ban for civilian US recipients suspended until 27 November 2026. The April 2025 controls remain. Overall estimate: no documented figure found. | [9] [4] [8] |
| China | EU | Export and raw material controls: The same export controls apply to deliveries to the EU (licence requirement). | April 2025 | In November 2025, 11.2 percent of German industrial firms reported material shortages, 27.6 percent in the car industry; ifo considered China’s controls the likely cause, but did not ask about it. | [10] [9] |
| US | EU | Tariffs: Tariffs on steel and aluminium (Section 232) raised to 50 percent on 4 June 2025; since 24 July 2026, 10 percent net of the most-favoured-nation tariff on other goods (Section 301). | 2025 | German exports to the US January to August 2026 −6.5 percent against 2024, cars −26.8 percent. In the US: price level about +0.7 percent in the long run, about 1,100 US dollars per household and year (under current law, July 2026). | [11] [1] [12] [13] |
| EU | China | Tariffs: Countervailing duties on battery electric cars, 7.8 to 35.3 percent by producer, for five years. | 30 October 2024 | No documented damage figure in this research. | [14] |
| EU | Russia | Sanctions and financial bans: Sanctions packages with export and import bans; exclusion of banks from SWIFT (2 March 2022); transaction ban with 70 Russian banks and 632 listed vessels (20th package, 23 April 2026). | 2014, expanded since 2022 | Russia’s trade with sanctioning states after the 2022 and 2023 sanctions on average about 24 percent lower than with other states; German exports to Russia 26.8 billion euros (2021) and 6.9 billion euros (2025). | [15] [16] [17] [12] |
| US | Russia | Sanctions and financial bans: Financial, trade and technology sanctions. | 2014, expanded since 2022 | According to GSDB R4, the sanctions of the US and Canada are among the strictest against Russia, measured by their effect on trade. | [17] |
| Russia | EU | Sanctions and financial bans: Import ban on food from the EU and other sanctioning states; further countermeasures since 2022. | 2014 | In 2014 to 2015 Russia lost about 53 billion US dollars (7.4 percent of expected exports), the sanctioning countries about 42 billion (0.3 percent of their exports); most of the Western loss concerned goods that were not banned. | [18] |
| US | Gulf | Closure of sea routes: Sanctions against Iran in several waves since 1979; disconnection of Iranian banks from SWIFT in 2012 after an EU Council decision; US blockade of Iranian seaborne exports since 13 April 2026. | 1979; 2012; 13 April 2026 | Until the blockade Iran exported about 2 million barrels a day, according to Brookings. | [19] [20] [21] |
| Gulf | China | Closure of sea routes: After the US and Israeli attacks on Iran from 28 February 2026 the Strait of Hormuz was effectively closed in June 2026: Iran attacked ships and insurance disappeared. Before the war about 20 percent of the world’s oil supply passed through it. | March 2026 | As of June 2026. IEA: output of affected countries down more than 14 million barrels a day, the largest supply disruption in the history of the oil market. Dallas Fed: world growth in the second quarter of 2026 −2.9 percentage points annualised; by end 2026, 0.2 to 1.3 percentage points lower depending on duration (fourth quarter over fourth quarter). | [21] [22] [23] |
| Gulf | EU | Closure of sea routes: The same closure hits Europe through oil, gas and fuel prices. | March 2026 | See Hormuz and China; no separate estimate for the EU was found. | [21] [22] |
| US | Mercosur | Tariffs: Since 24 July 2026, 12.5 percent on goods from Brazil (Section 301, forced labour), on top of existing Section 301 duties. | 24 July 2026 | No documented damage figure in this research. | [1] |
| EU | Mercosur | Opening through agreements: EU and Mercosur trade agreement (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay), signed 17 January 2026; the European Parliament referred it to the CJEU on 21 January 2026; provisional application since 1 May 2026. | 1 May 2026 | Opening, no damage; tariffs fall gradually over up to 18 years. | [24] [25] |
| US | ASEAN | Tariffs: Since 24 July 2026 Section 301 tariffs on goods from 60 economies, including Vietnam at 12.5 percent. | 24 July 2026 | No documented damage figure in this research. | [1] |
| China | ASEAN | Opening through agreements: Upgrade of the ASEAN and China free trade agreement, signed in Kuala Lumpur. | 28 October 2025 | Opening, no damage. | [26] |
| US | Africa | Opening through agreements: Duty-free access for African goods (AGOA): lapsed at the end of September 2025, renewed retroactively, extended on 2 September 2026 to 31 December 2028. | 2 September 2026 (extension) | Opening after a gap; no documented damage figure for the gap. | [27] |
| Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain, Egypt | Qatar | Closure of airspace, land border and ports to Qatar | 5 June 2017 to 5 January 2021 (al-Ula declaration) | No documented overall estimate found; Qatar supported its economy and banks with billions in the first months (figures only in secondary sources). | [28] |
| ECOWAS | Niger | Border closure, flight ban, halt of trade and payments, asset freeze | after the 2023 coup, lifted 24 February 2024 | No documented damage figure in this research. | [29] |
| US | Cuba | Embargo, one of the oldest cases still running in the list of Hufbauer et al. | 1960 | The embargo hampers trade and payments; at the same time the Cuban leadership bears responsibility for the failure of its own economic policy and for repression: Prisoners Defenders counted 1,351 political prisoners at the end of September 2026. | [19] [30] |
What blockades cost: documented estimates with ranges
| Blockade | Estimate | Source |
|---|---|---|
| World economy splitting into blocs, long term | 0.2 to 7 percent of world output; with technological decoupling 8 to 12 percent in some countries | IMF 2023 [33] |
| Decoupling into two blocs, long term | at least 5 percent of world output | WTO Director-General 2023 [34] |
| Closure of the Strait of Hormuz 2026 | World growth in the second quarter of 2026 −2.9 percentage points annualised; by end 2026, 0.2 to 1.3 points lower depending on duration; oil price (WTI) 67 to 132 US dollars depending on scenario | Dallas Fed, scenarios [22] |
| US tariffs, cost for the US itself | Price level about +0.7 percent in the long run; about 1,100 US dollars per household and year; average tariff rate 11.1 percent | Yale Budget Lab, 24 July 2026 [13] |
| Refund of unlawful US tariffs | about 166 billion US dollars collected from more than 330,000 importers; 81 billion refunded by July 2026 | Judgment of 20 February 2026 and consequences [2] |
| Sanctions against Russia, trade | Trade with sanctioning states on average about 24 percent lower (2022 to 2023); complete trade sanctions in general about −64 percent | GSDB R4 [17] |
| Russia 2014 to 2015, both sides | Russia about 53 billion US dollars (7.4 percent of exports), sanctioning countries about 42 billion (0.3 percent) | Crozet and Hinz 2020 [18] |
| Chip export controls, one company | 4.5 billion US dollar charge, 2.5 billion not shipped, about 8.0 billion expected revenue loss in the following quarter | NVIDIA 2025 [7] |
The estimates measure different things (growth, trade, prices, losses of single firms) and cannot be added up. Where no documented figure was found, the table above says so; nothing is estimated here independently.
Payment systems: exclusion and workarounds
SWIFT is the banks’ messaging service for international payments, based in Belgium and therefore subject to EU law. In March 2012 SWIFT had to disconnect sanctioned Iranian banks after an EU Council decision (SWIFT). On 2 March 2022 the EU decided to exclude seven Russian banks (Council of the EU); under the 20th package of 23 April 2026 EU firms are barred from dealing with 70 Russian banks and with Russian crypto providers (Commission).
Workarounds. Russia uses its own system SPFS, China is expanding CIPS. According to the People’s Bank of China, CIPS processed payments of 123.06 trillion yuan in 2023 and 175.49 trillion yuan in 2024 (plus 42.6 percent); for messaging, however, CIPS still largely relies on SWIFT (overview). Part of the trade with Russia runs through neighbouring states: German exports to Kyrgyzstan in 2023 were 14 times their 2021 level (Eurostat, own analysis); in its 20th package the EU therefore used its anti-circumvention tool for the first time, against Kyrgyzstan (Commission).
Effect on bystanders. Banks scrutinise payments to and from sanctioned countries closely and refuse when in doubt. This also affects permitted business and humanitarian deliveries; Germany has no official count of rejected payments.
Limits
Global Trade Alert counts measures, not their size, and revises recent years upwards because of reporting lags. Grouping into economic blocs is a simplification: sanctions are usually imposed by states or the EU on states, firms and individuals. For many relations there is no documented damage estimate; where that is the case, it says so. The situation changes quickly; this page reflects 3 November 2026.
Continue: Who has been sanctioning more, and since when? and the magazine chapter Blockades of the world economy.
Sources
- Global Trade Alert: Forced-Labour Section 301 Tariffs on 60 Economies Take Effect on 24 July, 24 July 2026. https://globaltradealert.org/blog/forced-labour-section-301-final-action
- US Supreme Court, Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump, judgment of 20 February 2026; overview of consequences (Section 122, Section 301, refunds) on Wikipedia, as of July 2026. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Learning_Resources,_Inc._v._Trump
- China Briefing (Dezan Shira): Trump-Xi Meeting, US and China Agree to Tariff, Rare Earth Concessions, November 2025. https://www.china-briefing.com/news/trump-xi-meeting-outcomes-and-implications/
- Rinnovabili: Chinese rare earth exports, Trump-Xi truce extended to Jan 2027, 25 September 2026. https://www.rinnovabili.net/policy-and-affairs/environmental-policies/chinese-rare-earth-exports-trump-xi-truce/
- Federal Register, 13 October 2022, BIS: Implementation of Additional Export Controls, Certain Advanced Computing and Semiconductor Manufacturing Items. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2022-10-13/html/2022-21658.htm
- Federal Register, 5 December 2024, BIS: further controls on semiconductor manufacturing and memory chips. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2024-12-05/html/2024-28270.htm
- NVIDIA, results for the first quarter of fiscal 2026, Form 8-K, 28 May 2025. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1045810/000104581025000115/q1fy26pr.htm
- Global Trade Alert: thread pages and their export files, as of 2 November 2026; licence CC BY-NC 4.0. https://globaltradealert.org/threads/harmful-trade-interventions
- GvW Graf von Westphalen: China Export Control Update, November 2025 (announcements 46/2024, 18/2025, 61/2025, 70/2025, 72/2025). https://www.gvw.com/en/news/blog/detail/china-export-control-update
- dpa-AFX via onvista: material shortages in German industry, China the likely cause, 1 December 2025 (ifo survey). https://www.onvista.de/news/2025/12-01-roundup-materialmangel-in-industrie-china-wahrscheinliche-ursache-0-10-26455522
- Proclamation by the US President of 3 June 2025 raising Section 232 tariffs on steel and aluminium to 50 percent. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/DCPD-202500655/html/DCPD-202500655.htm
- Eurostat Comext, own analysis by Helfen statt Blockieren (in-depth research on economic effects and short study on exports to the US, both 3 November 2026). https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/comext/newxtweb/
- Yale Budget Lab: The State of U.S. Tariffs, 24 July 2026. https://budgetlab.yale.edu/sites/default/files/page_to_pdf/1568/publication_1568.pdf
- European Commission, Access2Markets: countervailing duties on battery electric vehicles from China, 30 October 2024. https://trade.ec.europa.eu/access-to-markets/en/news/eu-commission-imposes-countervailing-duties-imports-battery-electric-vehicles-bevs-china
- European Commission, DG FISMA: EU adopts 20th package of sanctions against Russia, 23 April 2026. https://finance.ec.europa.eu/news/eu-adopts-20th-package-sanctions-against-russia-2026-04-23_en
- Council of the EU: certain Russian banks banned from SWIFT, press release, 2 March 2022. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/03/02/russia-s-military-aggression-against-ukraine-eu-bans-certain-russian-banks-from-swift-system-and-introduces-further-restrictions/
- Yalcin, Felbermayr, Kariem, Kirilakha, Kwon, Syropoulos, Yotov: The Global Sanctions Data Base, Release 4. CGPA Working Paper 2025-02, Drexel University, 22 January 2025 (not peer reviewed). https://www.lebow.drexel.edu/sites/default/files/2025-01/wp2025002-global-sanctions-db-v2.pdf
- Crozet, Hinz: Friendly fire, the trade impact of the Russia sanctions and counter-sanctions. Economic Policy 35(101), 2020, pp. 97 to 146. https://econpapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:ecpoli:v:35:y:2020:i:101:p:97-146.
- Hufbauer, Schott, Elliott, Oegg: Economic Sanctions Reconsidered, 3rd edition, Peterson Institute 2007, chapter 1 (publisher preview), tables 1.1 and 1A.1. https://www.piie.com/publications/chapters_preview/4075/01iie4075.pdf
- SWIFT: SWIFT instructed to disconnect sanctioned Iranian banks following EU Council decision, March 2012. https://www.swift.com/insights/press-releases/swift-instructed-to-disconnect-sanctioned-iranian-banks-following-eu-council-decision
- Gross, Beane: From chokepoint to crisis, The Strait of Hormuz and global oil markets. Brookings, 8 June 2026. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/from-chokepoint-to-crisis-the-strait-of-hormuz-and-global-oil-markets/
- Kilian, Plante, Richter: What the closure of the Strait of Hormuz means for the global economy. Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, 20 March 2026. https://www.dallasfed.org/research/economics/2026/0320
- IMF: World Economic Outlook, October 2026, 13 October 2026. https://www.imf.org/en/publications/weo/issues/2026/10/13/world-economic-outlook-october-2026
- White & Case: EU to provisionally apply EU-Mercosur Interim Trade Agreement pending CJEU opinion, 10 March 2026. https://www.whitecase.com/insight-alert/eu-provisionally-apply-eu-mercosur-interim-trade-agreement-pending-cjeu-opinion
- Euronews: EU says Mercosur deal set for provisional application from 1 May, 23 March 2026. https://euronews.com/my-europe/2026/03/23/eu-says-mercosur-deal-set-for-provisional-application-from-1-may
- The Star: Asean-China Free Trade Area Upgrade marks major boost, 28 October 2025. https://www.thestar.com.my/news/nation/2025/10/28/asean-china-free-trade-area-upgrade-marks-major-boost-in-economic-cooperation-trade-facilitation
- California Chamber of Commerce: President Signs Another Short-Term Renewal of Trade Preference for African Nations, 8 September 2026. https://advocacy.calchamber.com/news/2026/09/president-signs-another-short-term-renewal-of-trade-preference-for-african-nations
- Qatar diplomatic crisis 2017 to 2021, overview with references (Wikipedia). https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qatar_diplomatic_crisis
- ICIR Nigeria: ECOWAS lifts sanctions on Niger, Mali, Burkina Faso, 24 February 2024. https://www.icirnigeria.org/ecowas-lifts-sanctions-on-niger-mali-burkina-faso/
- Prisoners Defenders: political prisoners in Cuba, report for September 2026, 15 October 2026. https://www.prisonersdefenders.org/2026/10/15/presos-politicos-cuba-septiembre-2026/
- WTO: 32nd Report on G20 Trade Measures (mid-October 2024 to mid-October 2025), 13 November 2025. https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news_docs/32nd_WTO_Report_on_G20_Trade_Measures.pdf
- WTO: trade monitoring report on all members, 2 December 2025. https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news25_e/trdev_02dec25_225_e.htm
- Aiyar et al.: Geoeconomic Fragmentation and the Future of Multilateralism, IMF Staff Discussion Note SDN/2023/001, 15 January 2023; figures as reported by Reuters via Malay Mail, 16 January 2023. https://www.malaymail.com/news/money/2023/01/16/imf-says-fragmentation-could-cost-global-economy-up-to-7pc-of-gdp/50425
- WTO Director-General Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, as reported by Islands Business, 4 May 2023. https://islandsbusiness.com/news-break/trade-fragmentation/
- Cross-Border Interbank Payment System, overview with figures from the payment system reports of the People’s Bank of China for 2023 and 2024 (Wikipedia). https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cross-Border_Interbank_Payment_System