Since 2022 Germany has been the weakest large growth case in the EU. How much of this is due to sanctions and counter-sanctions is the question most often asked and least often answered cleanly. This piece separates what is established from what remains disputed.
Germany compared with itself: six years almost without growth
Real GDP in 2025 was only +0.8% above 2019, and 0.7% lower per head. Year by year: 2022 +1.9%, 2023 −1.0%, 2024 0.0%, 2025 +0.2% (Eurostat, 22 Oct 2026, after revisions). In the third quarter of 2026 the economy grew by 0.2 percent on the previous quarter. Manufacturing output is 14.0% below 2018. In mid-2026 manufacturing employed 144,100 fewer people than a year earlier, the car industry 42,300 fewer. In 2025 the courts recorded 24,064 corporate insolvencies, the most since 2014; claims fell, however, so smaller firms were hit more.
Change in percent, production index. Energy-intensive industries lose most.
| Industry | Change |
|---|---|
| Glass, ceramics, stone | −21.3% |
| Chemicals | −21.1% |
| Paper | −18.8% |
| Basic metals | −11.2% |
| Machinery | −8.9% |
| Manufacturing | −6.1% |
| Motor vehicles | +7.8% |
Analysis: Helfen statt Blockieren. Data: Eurostat sts_inpr_a, 31.10.2026.
The industries that use a lot of energy lost most: chemicals, paper, glass and ceramics. Electricity for business in Germany cost 18.1 euro cents per kWh in the first half of 2021, 23.6 cents in the second half of 2024 and 20.6 cents in the first half of 2026.
Euro cents per kWh excluding VAT, annual use 500 to 2,000 MWh, half-years.
| Half-year | Germany | EU |
|---|---|---|
| 2019-S1 | 15.6 | 12.2 |
| 2019-S2 | 16.1 | 11.9 |
| 2020-S1 | 17.8 | 12.6 |
| 2020-S2 | 18.2 | 12.6 |
| 2021-S1 | 18.1 | 12.9 |
| 2021-S2 | 18.6 | 14.5 |
| 2022-S1 | 21.3 | 18.4 |
| 2022-S2 | 20.6 | 21.1 |
| 2023-S1 | 21.9 | 21.5 |
| 2023-S2 | 21.8 | 20.0 |
| 2024-S1 | 23.3 | 18.9 |
| 2024-S2 | 23.6 | 19.4 |
| 2025-S1 | 22.8 | 19.0 |
| 2025-S2 | 22.6 | 18.4 |
| 2026-S1 | 20.6 | 18.0 |
Analysis: Helfen statt Blockieren. Data: Eurostat nrg_pc_205, 19.10.2026.
Compared with the EU: weaker growth, unremarkable debt and insolvencies
The EU grew by +0.4% in 2023 and by +1.4% in both 2024 and 2025. Per head it gained +6.0% since 2019, while Germany lost 0.7%. On insolvencies Germany is not above the EU trend: the index rose by +28.6% from 2019 to 2025, in the EU by +34.7%. At 62.8% of GDP, the debt ratio is lower than the EU average. The gap to the EU average electricity price has narrowed but not closed.
Real GDP per head, index 2019 = 100.
| Year | Germany | EU |
|---|---|---|
| 2014 | 92.9 | 90.2 |
| 2015 | 93.8 | 92.2 |
| 2016 | 95.3 | 93.8 |
| 2017 | 97.9 | 96.4 |
| 2018 | 99.0 | 98.3 |
| 2019 | 100.0 | 100.0 |
| 2020 | 96.1 | 94.6 |
| 2021 | 100.0 | 100.7 |
| 2022 | 101.2 | 103.7 |
| 2023 | 99.3 | 103.6 |
| 2024 | 99.0 | 104.8 |
| 2025 | 99.3 | 106.0 |
Analysis: Helfen statt Blockieren. Data: Eurostat nama_10_pc, 22.10.2026.
Compared with the world: Russia nearly gone, China smaller, the US with tariffs
Exports to Russia were 38.0 billion euros in 2012, 26.8 billion in 2021 and 6.9 billion in 2025. In 2021 Russia thus accounted for 1.9% of German exports; the direct loss is small for the economy as a whole and large for individual firms and regions. Exports to China fell from 106.8 billion euros (2022) to 81.2 billion (2025), driven by China’s own production, weak demand and policy, including export controls on rare earths. Germany shipped more to the US in 2025 than in 2021, but from January to August 2026 exports were 6.5 percent below 2024; the German Economic Institute (IW) estimates the cost of US tariffs at a 15 percent base rate at 0.4 percent of GDP a year on average in 2025 to 2028. Exports to Iran halved after US sanctions returned in 2018. Exports to Cuba fell from 238 million euros (2017) to 98 million euros (2025); there the US embargo and the failures of Cuba’s leadership, under which Prisoners Defenders counted 1,351 political prisoners, work together.
Change in percent, nominal.
| Partner | Change |
|---|---|
| Russia | −74.2% |
| Iran | −33.2% |
| China | −22.3% |
| Cuba | −13.3% |
| United States | +19.8% |
Analysis: Helfen statt Blockieren. Data: Eurostat Comext DS-045409, 16.10.2026.
What is established
Russian gas disappeared in 2022; gas use fell by about 20 percent, and the economy did not collapse as feared (Moll, Schularick, Zachmann 2023). Energy-intensive output has fallen markedly since then and has not recovered. Exports to Russia have dropped to a quarter. A trend calculation by the IW puts the cost of the crises since 2020 at about 940 billion euros of value added, to be read as an order of magnitude.
What is disputed
How costly the gas cut-off was: beforehand, economists expected 0.5 to 3 percent of GDP, studies commissioned by business associations 6 to 12 percent. Critics of the low numbers point to the persistently lower industrial output. Whether the weakness stems mainly from energy prices or from structural problems: the German Council of Economic Experts names weak private investment, low productivity and high corporate taxes; the Bundesbank puts potential growth at 0.3 to 0.4 percent a year. In 2026 a new energy price shock was added by the war in the Middle East.
Which part is due to sanctions
Hardly separable. Three channels can be named but not cleanly quantified: direct trade with sanctioned countries (measurable, small for the economy), energy prices (large, but the result of war, Russia’s supply cut and EU embargoes together) and the caution of banks and firms (plausibly large, not measured). Anyone quoting a single percentage for the cost of sanctions should disclose their assumptions.
How households and firms experience the effects is covered in “What a blockade means for households, small firms and large companies”. Whether GDP shows the situation correctly is examined in “Is the economy really growing?”. US tariffs by product group are covered by the short study on exports to the US.
Check the numbers
The time series are available as CSV files and the calculation as a Python script without extra libraries: daten/abruf.py downloads the data from Eurostat and the IMF, daten/auswertung.py computes the results (ergebnis_*.csv). Chain-linked volumes do not add up exactly; differences in the last digit are rounding.
This piece is information, not legal or investment advice. “Helfen statt Blockieren” is non-partisan.
Sources
- Eurostat, nama_10_gdp, nama_10_pc, sts_inpr_a, nrg_pc_205, sts_rb_a, gov_10dd_edpt1, https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/api/dissemination/statistics/1.0/data/
- Eurostat, Comext DS-045409, https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/api/comext/dissemination/statistics/1.0/data/DS-045409
- Destatis, PM 381, 30.10.2026, https://www.destatis.de/DE/Presse/Pressemitteilungen/2026/10/PD26_381_811.html
- Destatis, PM 085, 13.3.2026, https://www.destatis.de/DE/Presse/Pressemitteilungen/2026/03/PD26_085_52411.html
- Destatis, PM N032, 15.5.2026, https://www.destatis.de/DE/Presse/Pressemitteilungen/2026/05/PD26_N032_42.html
- Destatis, PM N057, 14.8.2026, https://www.destatis.de/DE/Presse/Pressemitteilungen/2026/08/PD26_N057_42.html
- IW Köln, Kolev-Schaefer, Hüther, IW-Kurzbericht 68/2025, 7.8.2025, https://www.iwkoeln.de/fileadmin/user_upload/Studien/Kurzberichte/PDF/2025/IW-Kurzbericht_2025-Kosten-der-aktuellen-US-Zollpolitik.pdf
- IW Köln, Grömling, Dauerkrisen, 7.2.2026, https://www.iwkoeln.de/presse/pressemitteilungen/michael-groemling-dauerkrisen-kosten-deutschland-fast-eine-billion-euro.html
- Moll, Schularick, Zachmann, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2023, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-power-of-substitution-the-great-german-gas-debate-in-retrospect
- Bachmann u. a., Economica 91(364), 2024, DOI 10.1111/ecca.12546, https://econpapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:econom:v:91:y:2024:i:364:p:1157-1200
- Sachverständigenrat, Jahresgutachten 2025/26, https://www.sachverstaendigenrat-wirtschaft.de/en/annualreport-2025-pressrelease.html
- Deutsche Bundesbank, Prognose 12.6.2026, https://www.bundesbank.de/en/press/press-releases/the-bundesbank-s-forecast-for-germany-energy-price-shock-slowing-down-economic-recovery-964668
- Monopolkommission, Hauptgutachten 2026, 9.7.2026, https://www.monopolkommission.de/en/publications/main-reports/competition-2026-towards-a-competition-oriented-economic-policy
- Prisoners Defenders, 15.10.2026, https://www.prisonersdefenders.org/2026/10/15/presos-politicos-cuba-septiembre-2026/
All online sources accessed on 3 November 2026.
